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Electronic mail messages are often sent to more than one destination; this gives rise to problems when security is
required. A recent draft for a standard for securing electronic mail messages uggests a novel mechanism for solving the
problem. Unfortunately, as shown herein, the solution is flawed and can allow the construction of fake messages which
will pass the authenticity tests..
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this solution has a flaw which in certain circumstances
allows the malicious construction of apparently authentic
messages.
Finally note that it is not the intention of the author to
criticise what is after all only an RFC,l but rather to
ensure that possible solutions to multi-destination secure
message authentication problems are analysed with
care. There are many lessons to be learnt from the study
of flawed systems which are apparently perfectly
secure.
1. INTRODUCTION
In most if not all of today's electronic mail systems there
exists the capability of sending a message to a list of users
simultaneously. When such a message is sent, it will often
only be replicated when it really needs to be, so that a
single message sent from the U.K. to two recipients in the
U.S.A. will only be made into two copies after it has
crossed the Atlantic.
Such a process is obviously desirable, not least because
of the saving in information that needs to be sent across
potentially heavily loaded communications links. How-
ever, a problem arises when a message containing
sensitive information needs to be encrypted and/or
authenticated to protect it against disclosure and/or
alteration whilst in transit.
In most envisaged secure communication systems a
pair of users who wish to communicate securely are
equipped with a key known only to them. This key can
then be used with an encryption algorithm to encrypt
and/or authenticate messages.
So if a message is to be sent securely to two different
users, then it will need to be -encrypted using two different
keys. Perhaps the most obvious solution to this problem
is to replicate the message locally, i.e. to send two copies
of the message encrypted appropriately. This has a
considerable overhead for local communications,
particularly for messages sent to large groups of users.
Another relatively simple solution is to require the
provision of keys for groups of users who commonly
communicate with one another. Thus, when a message is
to be sent to a particular group of users, the key specific
to that group is used in the encryption process, and the
message only needs to be sent once.
Unfortunately, a number of problems arise with this
solution. First, and perhaps most importantly, consider
the situation when it is necessary for a user to be
remo"ed from a set of mailing lists. This will require the
redistribution of all the group keys owned by that user.
This could be both very co.stly and difficult to manage.
The second problem is that the number of groups
involved may grow very large. In many situations almost
every message is sent to a slightly different list of people,
and the number of group keys required could very easily
become prohibitive.
It is clear that some other, simpler solution to the
multi-destination problem is required. We consider
below one ingenious solution proposed in a recent
Request For Comments (RFC) for the DARPA 'Inter-
net' electronic mail system.! However, as we shall see,
2  
A PROPOSED SOLUTION AND ITS
WEAKNESS
We describe here the essential details of the systemdescribed in the draft standard, 1 although many of the
statements made below are of more general application.
Interestingly, the basic idea for solving the multi-
destination secure mail problem has been independently
invented at least twice, although it does not appear in
any literature known to the author.
We first suppose that every pair of users, A, B say,
wishing to exchange secure mail are equipped with a
secret Interchange Key (IK), which we denote by KAB. It
is not important how this key is distributed, but we
assume that each key is known only to the appropriate
pair of users (and perhaps to a Key Distribution Centre,
if one exists). All messages are to be encrypted and/or
authenticated using a block cipher in Cipher Block
Chaining (CBC) mode, where the block cipher algorithm
to be used is immaterial, but it could, for example, be the
DES algorithm.4.5 Briefly, use of CBC means that the
message is first divided into a sequence of n-bit blocks,
M1, M2, ..., Mr, say, where n is the cipher block length
(e.g. for DES, n = 64). To perform the encryption or
authentication operation requires a key for the cipher (K
say) and an n-bit Initialisation Vector (IV), which for
convenience we call Co' Note that this IV is either pre-
agreed or sent with the message in an unencrypted form.
If CBC is to be used for encryption then the ciphertext is
C1, C2, ..., Cr where Ci = {MJK + Ci-l' '+' denotes bit-
wise X-or, and, as throughout this paper, {M}K denotes
the effect of enciphering block M using key K. If CBC is
to be used for authentication, then the Message Authenti-
cation Code (MAC) is equal to all or part of Cr. For
further details on CBC see, for example, the standard
modes of use for the DES algorithm.2,a
When a message is sent from user A to user B in a
secure fashion, the following procedure is followed. Note
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that there are basically two options for message security:
either (i) authentication with no encryption, or (ii) both
authentication and encryption; i.e. all secure messages
are authenticated. We first consider option (i).
1. A random Data Encrypting Key (DEK) is obtained
by A which is to be used to secure this message (and
no other message).
2. This DEK is encrypted using the block cipher in
Electronic Code book Mode,2.4 under KAB.
3. The message is encrypted using the block cipher in
CBC mode under the DEK with Initialisation
Vector (IV) set to all zeros. All the ciphertext blocks
except the last one are discarded, with the remaining
block forming the Message Authentication Code
(MAC), which is used to authenticate the message
to the receiver; this process is well established.6
Finally, the MAC is encrypted using the block
cipher in ECB mode under the control of KAB.
4. As encryption of the message is not required it is
now sent in clear form, preceded by the DEK
encrypted as in (2) and the MAC computed and
encrypted as in (3). The transmitted data will
therefore have the form:
{DEK}KAB, {MAC}KAB, message.
If option (ii) is required, i.e. if encryption is also required,
then steps (1), (2), (3) above are performed, followed by
steps (5), (6), (7) given below.
5. The DEK is modified by inverting the bits in
alternate nibbles to obtain the Modified DEK
(MDEK).
6. The clear message is encrypted again using CBC,
but this time under control of the MDEK (rather
than the DEK) together with a randomly chosen
IV.
7. The message is now sel}t, encrypted as in (6), and
preceded by the DEK encrypted as in (2), the MAC
computed and encrypted as in (3) and the randomly
chosen IV used in (6). The transmitted data will
therefore have the form:
{DEK}KAB, {MAC}KAB, IV, {message}MDEK
This completes the security process for messages ent
from one user to another single user. We now consider
how the process is modified in the case that user A wishes
to send the same message to users Band C (the process
works equally well for more than two users, and is
straightforward to generalise to that case).
For authentication only, step (1) as above is performed
followed by steps (2*), (3*) and (4*) given below.
2*. Two encrypted versions of the DEK are produced
using the block cipher in Electronic Codebook
Mode,2.4 once under KAB and once under
KAC.
3*. The message is encrypted using the block cipher in
CBC mode under the DEK with Initialisation
Vector (IV) set to all zeros. All the ciphertext
blocks except the last one are discarded, with the
remaining block forming the MAC which is used
to authenticate the message to the receiver. Finally,
two encrypted versions of the MAC are produced
using the block cipher in ECB mode, once under
KAB and once under KAC.
4*. As encryption of the message is not required it is
now sent in clear form, preceded by the two
encrypted versions of the DEK (computed as in
(2*» and the two encrypted versions of the MAC
(calculated as in (3*». The transmitted data will
therefore have the form:
{DEK}KAB, {MAC}KAB, {DEK}KAC, {MAC}KAC,message.
If option (ii) is required, i.e. if encryption is also required,
then steps (1), (2*), (3*) above are performed, followed by
steps (5), (6) and (7*), the last of which is given below.
7*. The message is now sent, encrypted as in (6), and
preceded by the two encrypted versions of the
DEK (see (2*», the two encrypted versions of the
MAC (see (3*» and the randomly chosen IV used
in (6). Theuansmitted data will therefore have the
form:
{DEK}KAB, {MAC}KAB, {DEK}KAC, {MAC}KAC, IV,
{message}MDEK.
Using this modified procedure, each of Band C can use
their own IK to recover the DEK used to authenticate
(and, if relevant, encrypt) the message. So far so good.
H~wever, we now show how user C can use such a
message to send a new message to B which B will believe
to have come from A. We describe the procedure for
authentication only, but the generalisation to encryption
should be clear.
C first creates the message which is to be sent to B as
if from A. The following procedure is then followed.
1. C recovers the MAC for the original message (this
can be done since it was sent encrypted under KAC
which is known to C).
2. In a similar way C recovers the DEK used to
authenticate the original message.
3. C decrypts the MAC using the DEK to obtain a
block we call x.
4. C encrypts the new message using CBC under the
control of the DEK to obtain a new MAC we
cally.
5. C joins the block x+ y on to the end of the new
message as an additional' garbage' block, where
the + denotes exclusive or of blocks.
6. C sends to B the new message (augmented by x + y)
preceded by the DEK encrypted under KAB and
the MAC from the original message also encrypted
under KAB. These latter pieces of information are
present in the original message and hence are
known to C.
A message prepared using steps (1)-(6) above will pass
B's authentication check using the MAC, and will
therefore be accepted as coming from A. The reason for
this is straightforward: the CBC encryption of the new
message using the DEK will produce final block y,
which, when added to the' garbage block' x + y will give
block x which encrypts to the desired MAC.
The one thing suspicious in the message is the' garbage'
block, although even this could be moved to the middle
or even the beginning of a message using an extension of
the procedure described above. It could well be the case
that in most cases messages containing such suspect
blocks will be rejected by their recipients, but this does
not remove the need to correct the problem. This is
because the possible acceptance of such messages, even in
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only exceptional cases, means, that the system must be
regarded as flawed.
It could also be argued tbat B will receive two
messages both secured using the same DEK, which
would be a rather suspicious event. However, if C was in
league with the network provider, then A's original
message could be prevented from getting to B, and no
unusual event would be detectable by B.
We have therefore discovered a major drawback with
the use of the suggested system for sending secure mail to
a multiplicity of users. Although it would be desirable to
try and' repair' the above system to preclude the type of
fraud described, it is by no means obvious how to do this.
The basic problem is that user C knows both the MAC
and the key used to generate the MAC for the original
message, and it is this, in combination with the fact that
the CBC function can be inverted, which makes the fraud
possible.
Possible secure modifications must either provide
distinct authentication keys and MACs for each intended
recipient, or use a one-way function to compute the
MAC thus preventing the inversion operation. The first
possible modification could be very time-consuming
since the MAC computation would need to be done for
every possible recipient. It is certainly true that all
proposed solutions need to be very carefully examined
for possible flaws.
Finally, observe that the motivation for one aspect of
the system described above is less than obvious, namely
the encryption of the MAC under the IK. It is interesting
to speculate that this is present to try and prevent the
type of fraud described here. Certainly it is true that
without this MAC encryption it would be even easier to
construct fraudulent messages, since the MAC could be
changed without detection and the' garbage' block
would not be necessary.
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BNCOD-7, Seventh British National
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The British Computer Society.
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ETC 89, the First European Test Conference,
Palais des Congres, Paris, France.
Topics: Component, board and system
testing; test development; test systems; design
for testability; and new test technologies.
Supported by: SEE, EUREL, IEEE Com-
puter Society, AICA, GME, lEE.
Contact: Colin Maunder, British Telecom
Research Labs, Martlesham Heath, Ipswich,
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promise and problems of exploiting AI in
practical software. The four foci of the
workshop are: AI-based support environ-
ments; AI mechanisms and techniques in
practical software; software engineering tools
and techniques for practial AI software: and
methodological issues.
The workshop will be structured around
invited presentations from both practitioners
and researchers from the USA and from
Europe. Each such presentation will be
followed by ample discussion time. In
addition, some short presentations of relevant
submitted papers will be scheduled. Several
panel discussions are also planned.
In order to facilitate the possibility of useful,
open discussion the workshop will be limited
to approximately 40 persons. If you would
like to participate, present a paper, or organise
a panel discussion, please send a one-page
sl!mmary of your interests in this area to:
12-14 APRIL 1989
Artificial Intelligence and Software Engineer-
ing: Promise and Problems. An International
Workshop sponsored by the AAAI, University
of Exeter.
Professor Derek Partridge, Department of
Computer Science, University of Exeter,
Exeter EX44PT, U.K. email: derek@uk.
ac.exeter.cs. Tel: 0392264069; fax: 0392
263108.
Papers will be presented on various aspects of
databases and database systems. This includes
topics such as:
.Deductive databases
.Object-oriented databases
.Multimedia databases
.Knowledge bases
.Expert database systems
.Distributed databases
.Data models
.Database performance
.Information retrieval
.Database design
.Advanced user interfaces
.Geographic/cartographic databases
For further information contact:
Professor M. H. Williams, Computer Science
Department, Heriot-Watt University, 79
Grassmarket, Edinburgh EHI 2HJ.
The purpose of this workshop is to present
and discuss a broad set of issues relating to the
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